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Summary
Failure to integrate Swat fully into Pakistan may 
have been the main cause of the unrest in this 
district since the late 1990s. Secondly, Local Govern­
ment Reforms since 2001 opened up further space 
for militants by demolishing the magistracy system 
that maintained the writ of the state. The inter­
connected religious, military and political history of 
the Pakhtun regions resonated with the Taliban’s call 
to Jihad. 
Issues of landless peasants and conflict between 
tenants and landlords, and demand for justice 
stoked the turbulence and created initial support for 
the militants. Their land redistribution schemes were 
partly popular among the dispossessed. The Taliban 
made effective use of radio broadcasts to gain sup­
porters for their ideology, issued edicts and gar­
nered donations. Women were particularly targeted 
through the Mullah FM radio. The military operation 
in Swat since 2009 has the support of the majority of 
the people. 
However, there is a need for the military presence 
to be gradually phased out under an exit strategy. 
An effective civilian administration and policing 
system should be introduced as the army draws 
down. Special attention should be placed on re­
building infra structure and improving the liveli­
hoods of the landless and most vulnerable in soci­
ety. An effective com munication strategy coupled 
with a re­conciliation programme based on the 
Pakhtun social proces ses and idiom remains pivotal 
for long­term security.
 
Introduction
The district of Swat is part of the Malakand division in 
the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP)1. A census 
in 1998 found the population at more than 1. 2 million. 
Governance of Swat is performed by the provincial 
government but under the provisions of Article 247 
of the Constitution under which the region is treated 
as a provincially administered tribal area (PATA). This 
method of administration restricts the authority of the 
government of KP and its legislature. Since the 1990s, 
the authority of the provincial government in Swat 
has been challenged.  The Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-
e-Mohammadi (TNSM)2 was first established in Swat 
in 1992 by a religious leader, Sufi Muhammad. He 
demanded the introduction of an Islamic justice system 
and frequently revolted against official authority. 
In 2001, President Pervez Musharraf banned the 
TNSM and had Sufi Muhammad jailed after his group 
took active part in fighting the U.S. intervention in 
Af ghani stan. Muhammad’s son-in-law, Maulana 
Fazlullah, also known as “Mullah Radio,” subsequently 
took control of the TNSM/Taliban in Swat. For a brief 
period in mid-2007, TNSM had effectively expelled 
gov ernment writ and controlled large parts of the 
district. 
In 2008, the provincial government in KP facilitated 
the release of Sufi Muhammad after he agreed to re-
nounce violence. Other leaders of the TNSM signed a 
peace agreement that recognised KP’s sov er eignty over 
Swat. After much controversy, the government of the 
KP made a deal with the Taliban in Swat in February 
1 From 2010, the province was renamed from North West Frontier 
Province (NWFP) to “Khyber Pakhtunkhwa”.
2 TNSM translate into Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic 
Law. Hereafter the term Taliban will be used to also encompass 
TNSM.
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2009. Under this regulation the government agreed to 
implement Sharia law in the wider Malakand division. 
Soon thereafter, Maulana Fazlullah’s followers violated 
the peace terms. They also forcibly took over the 
adjoining district of Buner. The Taliban’s expressed 
demand was the introduction of Sharia law but it 
seemed in effect a process of strategic domination.
Popular opinion turned against the Taliban, which faci-
li tated re-establishment of state control. In May 2009, 
the Pakistani army launched a military operation to 
wrest control of the districts of Buner and Swat from 
the Taliban. More than 600 000 of the residents of 
Swat became IDPs. The army gradually established 
control and the displaced population was able to 
return in significant numbers by late 2009. 
This policy brief attempts to outline some of the 
main reasons why the government was sidelined 
and the TNSM/Taliban thus were able to rapidly 
increase their influence since 2002. The analysis and 
recommendations in this policy brief are partly based 
on a survey conducted in Swat by the Regional In sti-
tute for Policy Research and Training (RIPORT) in 
February 2010.3 The survey included in-depth inter-
views with district officials and key informants, focus 
group discussions, and a questionnaire survey of 384 
random households.   
Brief History
The Swat region saw various invasions over the 
centuries. From the 8th century AD, the area was 
gradually converted to Islam. By the 14th century, the 
Pakthun tribe of the Yusufzais began infiltrating into 
the Swat Valley. The Yusufzais gained political promi-
nence and partly displaced the original inhabitants. 
The Islamic State of Swat was first established in 1849. 
In 1917, a local Jirga (council) appointed Mian Gul 
Abdul Wadud as the new ruler, or Wali, of Swat. The 
Wali ruled autocratically but co-opted both landlords 
and religious elements into his patronage network. 
However, Swat became progressively more closely 
linked to British India and subsequently to Pakistan 
both economically and politically. In 1969, the state 
of Swat was merged into the regular administration 
of Pakistan. 
The Role of Religion 
Religious sentiments and religious authorities have 
played a key role in political and military affairs in 
the Pakhtun-inhabited lands for hundreds of years. 
Especially in times of invasions and external occu-
pation, the call for Jihad (holy war) and the role of 
religious leaders have been prominent. Through 
shared religious affiliation the otherwise tribal fissures 
could be overcome. Calls for Jihad were made against 
Sikhs in the seventeenth century when they occupied 
what is now KP and later in 1847 when the British 
replaced the Sikhs as the paramount power. 
Islam has played a key role in the history of Pakistan 
itself. In 1949, the Pakistan Constituent Assembly 
passed a resolution for all laws to be in consonance 
with Islam. The wars of 1947, 1965 and 1971 against 
India were steeped in religious narrative. With the 
advent of Zia-ul-Haq, and later the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, the western border of Pakistan became a 
veritable jihadist base that attracted foreign mujahedin. 
The ties between religiously inspired groups and 
officialdom in Pakistan continued after the withdrawal 
of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989, and the 
subsequent disinterest of the U.S. in Afghan affairs. 
Jihadist training camps were tolerated and supported 
on both sides of the Afghan-Pakistani border. Training 
camps and jihadist bases continued to exist in parts of 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) after 
2001. 
Thus, the Taliban of Swat had ample historical as 
well as mythological resonance for their call for 
resistance, Jihad and religious revival. 83% of respon-
dents in the RIPORT survey opined that people of 
Swat were influenced by religious personalities. 67% 
of respondent households agreed there is a close 
connection between religious education and mili tancy. 
67% also had the opinion that calls for Jihad against 
the U.S. in Afghanistan had encouraged mili tancy in 
Swat. A full 78% agreed that the Pakistani govern-
ment’s alliance with the U.S. in the “war on terror” 
had encouraged people to support militants. 70% of 
the households stated that the Afghan Taliban assisted 
Swat militants. 
The Role of the Land Issue 
In the late fifteenth century, the Pakthun tribe of the 
Yusufzais started to forcefully occupy Swat. After 
the conquest, the lands were taken over by the new 
military nobility. The people who originally possessed 
these lands were scattered into the mountains or were 
employed as tenants by the new rulers.4 When Swat 
was finally merged into Pakistan in 1969, the ruler 
of Swat had proscribed the holding of land by non-
Pakhtuns. To some degree the nobility was composed 
of Yusufzais, while the non-Yusufzais formed the 
lower classes in society. 
During the period of Taliban rule in Swat from 2008, 
there was a lot of violence committed against the 
3 Aziz, Khalid (2010) “Swat: The Main Causes of the Breakdown 
of Governance and Rise of Militancy”. RIPORT. The report is 
available at Saeed Book Bank. Islamabad.
4 The dispossessed are today called Gujars and Kohistanis within 
Swat. Both these terms are considered to be pejorative.
3landed aristocracy. Many of them left their farms and 
homes and took refuge in other parts of the country. 
The Taliban in Swat started redistribution of property 
previously held by big, feudal landholders. This might 
have attracted followers to the Taliban, at least initially.5 
56% of the respondents of the RIPORT survey were 
of the view that there was a tense class relationship 
between the rich and the poor. When the respondents 
were asked whether class differences in Swat had fan-
ned militancy, 45% said yes, while 44% said that they 
didn’t know, while 11% thought that there was no role 
of class conflict in creating the militancy. 56% of the 
Swat households were of the opinion that the denial 
of land ownership to the Gujars made them more 
militant and prone to violence. 
The Role of Poverty
Poverty can result from many causes. A survey done 
in KP in 2001 compared the relative position of the 24 
districts of the province in terms of six base indicators.6 
The average infant mortality rate for the province was 
79 per 1000 live births, while in Swat the rate was 
95.7 per 1000. For malnourishment, Swat was ranked 
23rd out of 24 districts. Complications during birth 
and malnourishment could point to certain cognitive 
dis abilities arising among the population. In terms 
of primary school enrolment, access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation, Swat scored on or above the 
average for the 24 districts. 
According to the result of the RIPORT survey, 63% 
of the households agreed with the view that people 
joined the militants to improve their livelihoods. 85% 
held the view that there was a link between poor socio-
economic status and militancy. Entering the Taliban 
leadership hierarchy enabled individuals to share in 
the spoils. Some key informants disclosed that besides 
enriching themselves by looting rich households, 
money was made by selling the rubble of schools 
and hospitals destroyed by militant activity. 75% 
thought that unemployment induced youth to join the 
militants.
The Role of Communication
The Taliban leader of Swat, Maulana Fazlullah, also 
became known as “Mullah Radio” for his frequent 
use of an illegal FM radio that was broadcasting in the 
district. One of the major findings to emerge from the 
survey was the effective role played by the radio station 
in order to gain adherents to their ideology, inform on 
edicts, and also to act as a vehicle for the collection 
of donations. 78% of the respondents agreed that the 
FM radio helped the insurgency to gain a foothold in 
Swat. 56% agreed that the broadcast had built demand 
for the introduction of Sharia in Swat. 68% of the 
respondents agreed that the sermons broadcasted on 
the FM radio gathered support for the militants. 
The Role of Women
One of the more enigmatic aspects of the radio broad-
casts from “Mullah Radio” was its effect on women. 
According to some informants, the militants obtained 
the loyalties of women by presenting messages 
through religious interpretations. Some women felt 
empowered through their ability to call in and discuss 
problems, a way of interaction previously not available. 
Some women began to follow the advice of Mullah 
Fazlullah. They were encouraged to donate money 
and were also persuaded to pressurize relatives to join 
the movement.  Largely confined to the home, there 
was ample time for women to listen to the broadcasts. 
Some women respondents confessed to have become 
sup porters of the Taliban/TNSM. Paradoxically, some 
women saw the militants as a liberating influence.
Over a period of time, as the Taliban/TNSM became 
more entrenched and powerful, they began prompting 
women via their radio to make donations to their 
cause. Many female respondents reported that they 
gave their jewellery, money and in one case, a car, to 
the Taliban. Some of the pronouncements over the 
FM radio asked women to convince their husbands to 
join their ranks; other broadcasts urged women to hit 
the military and police patrols with stones when they 
came to their areas.
Governance
Pakistan has four kinds of regulatory spaces provided 
for its territory under the Constitution. Under Article 
246 (b) of the Constitution, Swat is a provincially 
admi nistered tribal area (PATA). Under Article 247 (2), 
the President can give directions to the Governor of 
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa for purposes of administration 
of Swat. Similarly, under Article 247 (3), the provincial 
assembly cannot legislate for Swat unless the President 
approves a legislation to be implemented. When an 
area is placed under the provision of Article 247 the 
nor mal jurisdiction of the courts is ousted, so the right 
of recourse to High and Supreme Court is denied. 
In 1994, the Supreme Court of Pakistan set aside 
the special provisions for the Malakand division 
and ordered the area to be governed under normal 
Pakistani law. But the decisions never took effect. 
Instead, support grew for Sufi Muhammad’s call for 
exclusive Sharia jurisdiction. From 2002, president 
5 Daud Khan Khattak, “The Battle for Pakistan: Militancy and 
Conflict in Swat Valley,” New America Foundation, Washing-
ton, P.5
6  “NWFP: A District-based Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey, 
2001,” Planning & Development Department, Govt of North 
West Frontier Province, Peshawar (2002). The indicators were 
infant mortality, malnourishment, primary school enrollment, 
adult literacy, access to safe drinking water, sanitation.
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Musharraf introduced Local Governance Reform 
that undid the joint police magistracy system, which 
had overseen crime and security aspects in the PATA 
districts. More power was devolved to local nazims or 
feudal lords.
56% of the households thought that the reform of 
local bodies led to the destabilization of administrative 
structures and provided space to the militants. 75% was 
of the view that government effectiveness, coordina-
tion and quality had declined in the wake of the local 
government reforms. 67% of the households held that 
the provincial administration’s contacts with militants 
in Swat also further encouraged them. 
Conclusion and Recommendations
Since the army’s incursion into Swat in April 2009, the 
situ ation has changed. The Taliban no longer reins free 
in the area although sporadic attacks have occurred. 
78% of the respondents stated that the situation had 
im proved since the deployment of the army. 68% 
thought that the militants had been neutralized. But 
89% of the households surveyed in Swat feared that 
there was every likelihood of bloodshed due to the 
Pakh tun proclivity to seek vengeance for any perceived 
wrong (Badal). During the last few years, Swat has 
been haunted by violent incidents that many families 
are itching to revenge – once the military leaves the 
valley.
Swat has been thoroughly devastated by the floods 
of August 2010. This tragedy comes on top of years 
of repression, devastation and mismanagement. The 
challenges are enormous. This policy brief would like 
to highlight a few key steps to be taken:
1. Improve civil-military coordination. Both the mili-
tary and the civilian administration should have 
a clear road map for the exit of the military. The 
longer it stays, the more delayed will be the nor-
mali zation. The police should be strengthened, 
trained and equipped to provide security. Militants 
must be granted due legal process and the pos-
sibility of reintegration. Extrajudicial measures 
are counterproductive. Strategic communication 
initia tives are crucial.
2. Undertake governance reform. Swat should be 
admi nistratively mainstreamed and the executive 
magi strate, the district magistrate and the police re-
established in consonance with the model practised 
prior to 12 October 1999. A comprehensive re-inte-
gra tion and rehabilitation plan should be under-
taken in coordination with similar initiatives in 
FATA. A reform monitoring unit should be esta b-
lished in the Chief Secretary’s Office to review the 
pace and depth of these reforms.
3. Poor and landless people should receive priority 
in assistance. The focus of investment should be 
on social protection and targeted safety nets for 
the very vulnerable. Local communities should be 
actively involved in deciding priorities.
4. Empowerment of women. Priority of funding 
must be given to women and female programmes 
in health, education and skill development and 
education.
5. Reconstruction of basic infrastructure. The floods 
have severely disrupted roads, bridges and power 
lines in Swat. Rebuilding these will be essential for 
economic recovery. 
